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PREFACE 
Former economic research at IIASA focused on comparative studies of 
structural changes in developed countries. The intensity of these changes 
has serious, and sometimes severe social implications. One area of current 
concern throughout the world is the diffusion of new technologies with a 
high potential in substituting labor in manufacturing and services, as well 
as drastically changing the existing patterns of international trade. 
In the process of formulating an agenda for the research within the 
Technology-Economy-Society (TES) Program, IIASA organized an expert meeting 
on "Socio-Economic Impacts of New Technologies", which was held in Warsaw, 
Poland, from 18 to 20 November 1985. Twenty-six participants from eleven 
countries and four international organizations discussed possible IIASA re- 
search in this field and came to an understanding that IIASA can and must 
contribute to the development of a conceptual framework for analyzing and 
forecasting the impact of high technology (e.g. robotics). 
M.J. Peck, an outstanding scholar contributing greatly to this issue, 
helped us structure the discussions during the meeting, in particular as a 
chairman of the final session. 
Prof. Peck was a Chairman of the Department of Economics of Yale Uni- 
versity and also served as a Member of the Council of Economic Advisors. 
He worked at IIASA as a Research Scholar within the "Minerals Trade and 
Markets" Project in 1983 and has been one of the very helpful IIASA alumni 
in the last years. 
This paper, which was presented at the meeting, stimulated the dis- 
cussions on the macroeconomic problems of High Technology and the final 
conclusions. We hope that it will also stimulate IIASA staff and other 
scholars in their thoughts about the very complex problem of industrial 
policy at a time of high technology diffusion on the industrial sector. 
Anatoli Smyshlyaev 
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INTRODUCTION 
My assigned t i t l e  i s  so broad t h a t  it  does no t  t rouble  my conscience 
t o  l i m i t  t h e  topic,.  One l i m i t a t i o n  i s  geographic. I w i l l  d e a l  only with 
f i v e  coun t r i e s  - t h e  United S t a t e s ,  Japan, the  Federal  Republic of Germany, 
the  United Kingdom, and France. They a r e  coun t r i e s  I know a b i t  more about 
than o t h e r s ,  but  a more scho la r ly  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  is t h a t  these f i v e  countr ies  
account f o r  85 percent  of the  R&D i n  t h e  21 OECD coun t r i e s .  Among these  21, 
the  f i v e  a l s o  a r e  the  most R&D in tens ive  a s  measured by the  r a t i o  of R&D 
expenditures t o  GNP with t h e  exception of Sweden, Switzerland, and the  
Netherlands. I look forward t o  the  d iscuss ions  a t  t h i s  conference t o  br ing 
out  information about R&D i n  o the r  coun t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  those t h a t  a r e  
more c e n t r a l l y  planned than t h e  OECD nat ions .  
I. DEFINITIONS AND THE R&D EXPENDITURES 
I def ine  the  high technology i n d u s t r i e s  a s  what t h e  OECD c a l l s  t h e  
engineering and chemical groups. The group t i t les  a r e  not  very desc r ip t ive ;  
It is more informative t o  simply l ist  t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  t h e  two group:. I n  
the  engineering group a r e  aerospace,  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  e l e c t r i c a l  products ,  
instruments,  machinery, computers, motor veh ic les ,  and shipbuilding;  i n  
t h e  chemical group a r e  chemicals, pharmaceuticals,  and petroleum r e f i n i n g  
(see  Table 1 ) .  Surely t h i s  is a d ive rse  l ist ,  but t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  have 
i n  common a high r a t i o  of R&D expenditures t o  value added compared t o  o the r  
i n d u s t r i e s .  High technology is a good j o u r n a l i s t i c  phrase but  t h e  more 
accura te  term would be the  research in tens ive  i n d u s t r i e s .  
While i t  is obvious t h a t  R&D expenditures a r e  concentrated i n  t h e  
research in tens ive  i n d u s t r i e s ,  it is s t r i k i n g  how g r e a t  is  the  concentrat ion.  
Table 2 te l l s  t h e  s t o r y :  t h e  research in tens ive  i n d u s t r i e s  account f o r  
TABLE 1 
The Research I n t e n s i v e  I n d u s t r i e s  
Engineering Group 
Aerospace 
E l e c t r o n i c s  
E l e c t r i c a l  products  
Ins t ruments  
Machinery 
Computers 
Motor Vehic les  
Shipbui ld ing  
Chemical Group 
Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals  
Petroleum r e f i n i n g  
Source: OECD Science and Technology I n d i c a t o r s ,  (OECD, P a r i s ,  1984) 
TABLE 2 
Percent  of To ta l  R&D Expenditures 
i n  Research In t ens ive  I n d u s t r i e s ,  1979 
Percent  of Percent  of 
Research Value 
Expenditure Added 
U.S. 
Japan 
F.R. Germany 
U.K. 
France 
Source: Calcula ted  from d a t a  i n  OECD Science and Technology I n d i c a t o r s  
(OECD, P a r i s  1984) 
47 t o  62 percent of the  t o t a l  R&D expenditures i n  each of these  f i v e  nat ions .  
I should underl ine t o t a l  R&D expenditures which includes expenditures of 
un ive r s i t i e s ,  government l abora to r ies ,  and separate  research i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
Note a l s o  t h a t  t h e  concentrat ion va s t l y  exceeds t he  share  of research 
in tens ive  i ndus t r i e s  i n  GNP. These nat ions  a r e  be t t i ng  much of t h e i r  R&D 
on a r e l a t i v e l y  small p a r t  of t h e i r  economy. 
The be t s  a r e  even more concentrated than Table 2 revea l s .  Despite 
a l l  t h e  t a l k  i n  the  United S ta tes  about t he  s m a l l  R&D f irms s t rung along 
Route 128 ou t s ide  Boston o r  the  "brain companies" i n  Japan, R&D i n  these  
count r i es  is concentrated i n  a few firms. In  the  United S t a t e s ,  the  twenty 
l a r g e s t  f i rms i n  terms of R&D spending account f o r  44.2 percent of the  
nationlsR&D expenditures,  i n  t he  United Kingdom 43 percent ,  and i n  Japan 
19.7 percent .  Indeed, the  biggest  R&D spenders pay out a staggering amount. 
General Motors is the  b iggest  R&D spender i n  the  United S ta tes  (apar t  from 
the  Pentagon). I f  General Motors were a na t ion ,  i t s  R&D expenditures would 
rank i t  nin th  among the  21 OECD nat ions ,  j u s t  behind the  Netherlands and 
ahead of Sweden. The Japanese e lec t ron ics  f i rm Hitachi  would rank with 
Finland, and t he  Swiss pharmaceutical f irm Giba-Geigy would rank j u s t  a f t e r  
Finland. R&D then i s  concentrated i n  the l a rge  f i rms i n  t h e  research 
in tens ive  i ndus t r i e s .  
One fu r t he r  concentrat ion deserves mention, though I am no t  su re  
how t o  evaluate  i ts  s ign i f i cance .  The United S t a t e s  accounts f o r  55 percent 
of the  t o t a l  R&D e f f o r t  of the  f i v e  nations.  But t h a t  concentrat ion is 
simply a r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  s i z e  of the  U.S. economy. I f  the  comparison i s  
by the percent of GNP devoted t o  R&D, the  United S t a t e s  ranks a f t e r  the  
Federal Republic of Germany among t h e  f i v e  nat ions;  i f  the  comparison is 
l imi ted  t o  c i v i l  R&D expenditures as percent of GNP, the  United S t a t e s  ranks 
a f t e r  both Germany and Japan. 
My t a l k  r e q u i r e s  one more comparison. Up t o  t h i s  p o i n t  I have focused 
on R&D expend i tu re s ,  b u t  t h a t  is  no t  t h e  same th ing  a s  who pays f o r  t h e  
r e sea rch .  Table 3 r e p o r t s  who pays f o r  t h e  r e sea rch  conducted by bus ines s  
e n t e r p r i s e s .  Unfor tuna te ly ,  d a t a  is  unava i l ab l e  t o  show how R&D is  f inanced  
i n  t h e  r e s e a r c h  i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s ,  bu t  t hese  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  such a 
l a r g e  p a r t  of a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  R&D t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  Table 3 would be a 
f a i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e sea rch  i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s .  
I n  a l l  f i v e  n a t i o n s  c l e a r l y  two-thirds o r  more of i n d u s t r i a l  r e sea rch  
is f inanced  by i n d u s t r y  from t h e  revenue r e a l i z e d  i n  t h e  market p l ace .  
The United S t a t e s  s t a n d s  a t  one extreme a s  t h e  n a t i o n  wi th  t h e  most i n d u s t r i a l  
R&D f inanced  by t h e  government; Japan is a t  t h e  o t h e r  extreme wi th  very  
l i t t l e  s o  f inanced .  That i s  i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  t h e  popular  s t e r e o t y p e  t h a t  
Japan does much t o  h e l p  i t s  r e sea rch  i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s  and t h e  United 
S t a t e s  does l i t t l e .  
The important  f a c t o r  i n  exp la in ing  t h e  d i f f e r i n g  r o l e  of government 
funding of r e s e a r c h  i n  i n d u s t r y  is no t  i n d u s t r i a l  bu t  defense p o l i c y .  
U.S. defense  and space  R&D accounts  f o r  78 percent  of Federa l  R&D funds  
f lowing t o  i n d u s t r y .  Th i s  e x p l a i n s , i n  turn ,  why about 56 percent  of Fede ra l  
R&D funds  a r e  spen t  i n  t h e  aerospace  industry,and Federa l  funds  account  f o r  
roughly 90 pe rcen t  of t h e  t o t a l  R&D expendi tures  i n  t h i s  i n d u s t r y .  A 
somewhat s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  p r e v a i l s  i n  t h e  United Kingdom. Defense R&D is 
l a r g e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t s ;  t h e r e  is d i s p u t e  a s  t o  how much 
economic b e n e f i t  i s  de r ived  from R&D defense c o n t r a c t s .  
I f  w e  set a s i d e  t h e  s p e c i a l  ca ses  of defense,  t h e  r e s e a r c h  i n t e n s i v e  
i n d u s t r i e s  l a r g e l y  f i n a n c e  t h e i r  R&D by t h e  revenues they  r e a l i z e  i n  t h e  
market.  To s a y  more, t hen ,  r e q u i r e s  looking a t  how market f o r c e s  i n f l u e n c e  
R&D. There should a l s o  be a n  a n a l y s i s  of decision-making v i t h i n  t h e  l a r g e  
f i rm .  Ecmomis ts ,  however are no to r ious ly  r e l u c t a n t  t o  examine what goes 
TABLE 3 
Financing of Industrial Research 
(Percent) 
United States 
Japan 
F.R. Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
Industry Government Abroad 
Source:Calculated from data in OECD Science and Technology Indicators 
(OECD, Paris 1984) 
on with the firm, preferring instead to rely on the simple assumption of 
profit maximization on the part of the firm. I will follow that tradition, 
partly because of ignorance of what goes on within the firm and partly 
because the operation of the market on R&D itself presents more than enough 
issues for this talk. In the first part of my talk then I will concentrate 
on the market and R&D. 
But what of industrial policy? And you also have noticed I left 
that term undefined. Industrial policy is defined here as government 
actions that influence the high technology industries in these five nations. 
Even though markets are the important part of the story, industrial 
policy has its influence largely by affecting the operation of the markets 
of the RbD intensive industries. If we regard market forces as a stew, 
then industrial policy is its pepper. The pepper is a small part of the 
dish, but it can surely influence its taste. The second part of my talk 
will deal with industrial policy. 
11. THE MARKET AND R&D 
Economists have t r i e d  t o  explain R&D by using supply and demand 
framework. Cer ta in ly  t h a t  can be done, but I pre fe r  t o  s t r e s s  two other  
f a c t o r s :  (1) technological  opportunity and (2)appropr iabi l i ty .  
Technological Opportunity is  the  a b i l i t y  t o  use R&D t o  devise new 
products t h a t  gain g r e a t  market acceptance and new processes t h a t  s ign i -  
f i c a n t l y  reduce c o s t s .  Technological opportunity e x i s t s  t o  some ex ten t  
f o r  a l l  i n d u s t r i e s ;  the  quest ion is one of degree. There is some con- 
t roversy  a s  t o  whether technological  opportunity is endogenous o r  exogenous 
t o  an indust ry .  Clear ly  i t  is  endogenous i n  t h a t  indus t ry ' s  pas t  
R&D e f f o r t s  c r e a t e  its cur ren t  technological  oppor tuni t ies .  But i f  we 
a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  explaining why some i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  research in tens ive  and 
o t h e r s  a r e  n o t ,  p a s t  R&D i t s e l f  needs t o  be explained. 
It must be then t h a t  i t  is t h e  exogenous f a c t o r s  t h a t  give more 
technological  opportunity t o  one indust ry  than another.  W e  can v i s u a l i z e  
a l l  i n d u s t r i e s  a s  s t a r t i n g  equal ,  but some a r e  receiving more f r e e  inpu t s  
of technology than o the rs .  
The cur ren t  R&D i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s  have had t h a t  s t a t u s  f o r  a  
considerable length  of time and so  one s i n g l e  f r e e  inpu t ,  a  dramatic 
s c i e n t i f i c  breakthrough, cannot be t h e  explanation f o r  t h e i r  research 
i n t e n s i t y .  Rather these  i n d u s t r i e s  must be receiving a continuing stream 
of g r e a t e r  technological  oppor tun i t i e s  t h a t  keeps them research i n t e n s i v e  
over many decades. The l i t e r a t u r e  suggest t h r e e  sources f o r  t h e  f r e e  
inputs :  (1) bas ic  sc ience  which i s  created  i n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  and research 
i n s t i t u t e s ;  (2) research from government l abora to r ies ;  and (3) R&D c a r r i e d  
out  by u s e r s  of t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  products. A l l  of these  a r e  f r e e  goods 
t o  t h e  f irm. I would stress t h a t  these  t h r e e  sources do not  provide 
f i n i s h e d  knowledge t h a t  can be u t i l i z e d  a s  an input  t o  f u r t h e r  R&D by 
t h e  indust ry .  Rather they a r e  inpu t s  f o r  the  R&D process  i t s e l f  and 
r a i s e  the  p roduc t iv i ty  of R&D expenditures compared t o  o the r  i n d u s t r i e s  
rece iv ing l e s s  of t h e  f r e e  inputs .  Higher p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  i n  t u r n ,  leads  
t o  more R&D spending. 
These f r e e  i n p u t s  a r e  t o  be d is t inguished from o t h e r  sources of 
p roduc t iv i ty  inc reas ing  inpu t s  from outs ide  t h e  indus t ry ;  namely, 
equipment and m a t e r i a l  innovations t h a t  a r e  made by s u p p l i e r s  ou t s ide  t h e  
indus t ry .  These, however, a r e  i n  f in i shed  form and so  r e q u i r e  l i t t l e  o r  no 
R&D by t h e  rece iv ing indus t ry .  Tex t i l e s  i s  an example. Equipment 
innovat ions ,  such a s  t h e  s h u t t l e l e s s  loom, and m a t e r i a l  innovations,  such 
a s  s y n t h e t i c  f i b e r s ,  have r a i s e d  t h e  product iv i ty  of t h e  t e x t i l e  indus t ry  
without  much R&D i n  t h e  t e x t i l e  indust ry  i t s e l f .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  is  t h a t  
b a s i c  sc ience  raises t h e  product iv i ty  of R&D i n  an indus t ry ,  whereas 
new equipment and m a t e r i a l s  raises t h e  product iv i ty  of t h e  indus t ry ' s  
product ion.  
Appropr iab i l i ty  is t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  innovating o rgan iza t ion  t o  
r e a l i z e  t h e  ga ins  of innovation i n  terms of increased p r o f i t s .  Ever 
s i n c e  Kenneth Arrow's pioneering a r t i c l e  i n  1961, economists have 
s t r e s s e d  t h e  s p e c i a l  r o l e  of appropr iab i l i ty  i n  t h e  production of new 
knowledge. The i n i t i a l  view emphasized t h e  publ ic  good charac te r  of new 
knowledge and t h e  r e l a t e d  idea  of its i nappropr iab i l i ty .  Innovators 
would p lace  t h e i r  new products  on t h e  market at  p r i c e s  t h a t  would 
inc lude  a  r e t u r n  on t h e i r  investment i n  R&D. Competitors would observe 
t h e  new product and i m i t a t e  them. The r e s u l t i n g  competi t ion between t h e  
innovators  and i m i t a t o r s  would d r i v e  down t h e  p r i c e  of t h e  new product 
and i n  t h e  process des t roy t h e  p r o f i t s  of innovation. 
Of course,  t he r e  would be some re turns  t o  innovation a r i s i n g  from 
the  t i m e  l a g  between innovation and imi ta t ion.  And pa ten t s  could protect  
the  monopoly pos i t ion  of t he  innovator. But the  point  i s  t h a t  generally 
the re  i s  a wedge o r  d i f fe rence  i n  the  soc i a l  r e tu rns  and the  p r i va t e  
r e t u rn s  from innovation. Competition passes on p a r t  of t he  s o c i a l  r e tu rns  
t o  consumers, leaving only p a r t  t o  be rea l i zed  by the  innovator. The 
d iv i s ion  between s o c i a l  and p r iva te  re tu rns ,  however, w i l l  vary between 
indust r ies ,and the  research in tens ive  indus t r i es  presumably w i l l  be the  
ones i n  which appropr iab i l i ty  is  t h e  highest .  
Empirical Testing would take the  form of whether appropr iab i l i ty  and 
technological  opportunity can explain the exis tence  of d i f f e r i n g  research 
i n t e n s i t i e s  across  i ndus t r i e s .  Both technological opportunity and appro- 
p r i a b i l i t y ,  however, a r e  not  d i r e c t l y  observable. Nor have t he r e  been 
obvious proxies f o r  e i t h e r  technological opportunity o r  appropr iab i l i ty  
t h a t  can be used t o  test t h e  r o l e  of these two f a c t o r s  i n  explaining d i f f e r i ng  
R&D i n t e n s i t i e s .  
A team of economists a t  Yale has created a set of da ta  t o  represent  
both technological  opportunity and appropr iab i l i ty .  The work of Levin 
and h i s  a s soc i a t e s  is ,  I think,  important and not  a s  widely known a s  i t  
should be. 
Levin used the  survey approach; a method t h a t  i s  uncommon among 
economists. The essence of t he  survey approach is t o  ask  economic agents 
t h e i r  views r a t h e r  than t o  r e l y  on t he  data generated by economic t ransact ions ,  
which i s  t h e  more common approach. Good surveys are an a r t  i t s e l f ;  I only . 
l is t  t h e  major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t he  Levin survey: 
1. The u n i t  of observation w a s  a l i n e  of business as defined 
by the  Federal  Trade Commission. A l i n e  of business general ly  
corresponds t o  t h e  400 some 4 d i g i t  i ndus t r i e s  i n  t h e  U.S. Census 
of Manufacturers, and so they a r e  narrower than the  indust ry  
categor ies  t h a t  a r e  used by the OECD. 
2 .  The survey was l imi ted t o  688 publicly traded f i rms,  
which . i s  a near ly  comprehensive list of s i gn i f i c an t  R&D 
performing firms i n  the  U.S. economy. 
3.The respondents were senior  R&D executives i n  a pa r t i cu l a r  
l i n e  of business,and they were t rea ted  a s  observers of the  R&D 
process i n  t h e i r  l i n e  of business r a t he r  than repor te r s  
of t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e i r  firm. They were asked t o  rank 
t h e i r  answers t o  var ious  questions on a s ca l e  of one t o  seven. 
The survey scores  were used i n  a mult iple regress ion t o  explain the  
dependent v a r i a b l e  of research in tens i ty ;  t h a t  is, the  r a t i o  of R&D 
expenditures t o  s a l e s  i n  a p a r t i cu l a r  l i n e  of business.  The independent 
va r i ab l e s  were t h e  scores  reported by respondents a s  t o  the  importance of 
va r ious  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e i r  l i n e s  of business. Table 4 l i s ts  t h e  va r iab les  
t h a t  were s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  a l l  the  various spec i f i ca t ions  of the  model. 
The th ree  s i g n i f i c a n t  va r iab les  a r e  science base, government 
l abo ra to r i e s ,  and the  proport ion of recent ly  i n s t a l l e d  plant  and equipment 
i n  the  l i n e  of business. Science base was measured by the  respondent 's  
r a t i n g  of t h e  importance of any one of eleven bas ic  sc ience  f i e l d s  t o  
t echn ica l  progress i n  h i s  o r  her  l i n e  of business. The higher the  average 
score  i n  any of these  f i e l d s ,  the  higher the  value assigned t o  sc ience  
base. A s imi la r  procedure w a s  used t o  represent  the  contr ibut ion of 
government l abora to r ies .  
One would expect t h a t  g rea te r  importance of sc ience  base and 
government l a b o r a to r i e s  would increase R&D i n t ens i t y .  They a r e  the  f r e e  
inpu ts  i n t o  t h e  research process discussed e a r l i e r  and they serve  t o  
make an indus t ry ' s  R&D more p rof i t ab le .  The Levin r e s u l t s  then confirm the  
simple hypothesis of the  importance of f r e e  inputs.  
TABLE 4 
Determinants of R&D Intensity 
(R&D Expenditures/~ales) 
Significant 
SCIENCE BASE 
GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY 
NEW PLANT 
Insignificant 
MATERIAL TECHNOLOGY 
EQUIPMENT TECHNOLOGY 
USER TECHNOLOGY 
APPROPRIABILITY 
IMITATION LAG 
CONCENTRATION 
Source: Adapted from Levin -- et al, "R&D Appropriability, Opportunity 
and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian 
Hypotheses. " American Economic Review, May 1985 
It i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  explain the  r o l e  of investment, defined 
he re  a s  t h e  percent  of t h e  l i n e  of business investment i n  proper ty ,  
p l a n t ,  and equipment i n s t a l l e d  s ince  1976. More R6D spending may l ead  
t o  a h igher  r a t e  of investment and obsolescence,or a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
i n d u s t r i e s  w i t h a  h i g h r a t e  of turnover i n  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  stock may be b e t t e r  
a b l e  t o  c a p i t a l i z e  on t h e i r  cu r ren t  R6D.  S t i l l  another i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
i s  t h a t  high R 6 D  l eads  t o  more new products  and an  expansion of s a l e s  
t h a t  i n  t u r n  r e q u i r e s  more investment. 
Perhaps of equal  i n t e r e s t  a r e  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  turn  out  t o  be 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  Three of these  a r e  o ther  sources of technological  knowledge 
e x t e r n a l  t o  the  indust ry  - namely s u p p l i e r s  of m a t e r i a l s ,  equipment,and 
u s e r s  of t h e  product.  But except f o r  use r  information, none of 
these  requ i re  l a r g e  R6D expenditures by f i rms i n  the  industry.  
Appropr iabi l i ty  measures ( including p a t e n t s ,  lead  t i m e ,  secrecy,  marketing 
advantages) t u r n  out  t o  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  This is somewhat s u r p r i s i n g  
considering the  importance assigned t o  a p p r o p r i a b i l i t y  i n  the  economic 
l i t e r a t u r e .  There may w e l l  be sca l ing  problems i n  t h i s  va r iab le .  
F ina l ly ,  concentra t ion - t h e  share of s a l e s  of t h e  four  l a r g e s t  f i rms  - 
i s  not  s i g n i f i c a n t ;  a r e s u l t  t h a t  tends  t o  con t rad ic t  previous f ind ings .  
I f  only concentra t ion is regressed aga ins t  R6D i n t e n s i t y ,  then concentra t ion 
is s i g n i f i c a n t .  But once t h e  measures of technological  opportunity a r e  
introduced concentra t ion becomes i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
To sum up, research in tens ive  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  those t h a t  have a 
s t rong  science base,  l a r g e  government contr ibut ions  t o  technological  knowledge, 
and a high r a t e  of investment i n  p lan t  and equipment. Hardly s u r p r i s i n g  
r e s u l t s ,  but i t  is w e l l  t o  have them confirmed quan t i t a t ive ly .  What remains 
t o  be explained is why some i n d u s t r i e s  have a s t rong science base and 
o t h e r s  do not .  That takes  u s  i n t o  t h e  l o g i c  and h i s t o r y  of sc ience ,  a s u b j e c t  
t h a t  remains mysterious t o  an economist. 
Some Other Concepts deserve mention even though they have not  been 
empir ica l ly  tes ted ,nor  do they f i t  neat ly  i n t o  the  explanation of t h e  
exis tence  and pers i s t ence  of the  research in tensive  indus t r i es .  
The f i r s t  of these  i s  a technological  t r a j e c t o ry  defined a s  tech- 
llological progress which proceeds along c e r t a i n  dimensions t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  
i n  r e t r o spec t ,  appear f a i r l y  smooth. Technological knowledge seems 
t o  fol low a c e r t a i n  path,  with one innovation proceeding apparently 
l og i ca l l y  from the  preceding invention and bui ld ing on the knowledge 
obtained i n  t h a t  innovation. An example would be random access  memories 
i n  which the  t r a j e c t o r y  is an increasing capacity of a s i ng l e  chip - from 
4K t o  16K t o  64K and now 256K. 
There can be breaks i n  the  technological t r a j e c t o ry ;  t h a t  is,  
t h e  successive in t roduct ion of innovations suddenly begins t o  fol low a 
d i f f e r e n t  course. An example would be t he  s h i f t  from vacuum tubes  t o  s e m i -  
conductors i n  e l e c t ro n i c s ,  o r  the  s h i f t  from p i s ton  t o  jet engines i n  
av ia t ion .  These breaks i n  technological t r a j e c t o r i e s  make t he  accumulated 
knowledge of l e s s  value  i n  making fu r the r  innovations. Perhaps a s  a r e s u l t ,  
breaks i n  t h e  technological  t r a j e c t o r i e s  are of ten  accompanied by t he  
en t ry  of new firms.  Thus the  introduction of j e t  engines w a s  accompanied 
by the  en t ry  of General E l ec t r i c  and Westinghouse i n t o  the  manufacture 
of av i a t i on  engines,and the  in t roduct ion of semiconductors was accompanied 
by t h e  rise of new f i rms such a s  Texas Instruments. 
A second concept i s  t h a t  of a dominant product. Economists 
consider t h a t  a product has various a t t r i b u t e s  valued by consumers. Some 
products a r e  dominant i n  some a t t r i b u t e s ;  o thers  i n  st i l l  another s e t  of 
a t t r i b u t e s .  A dominant new product i s  one t h a t  is superior t o  e x i s t i ng  
ones i n  every a t t r i b u t e .  Table 5 i l l u s t r a t e s  t he  evolution of t h e  
t r a n s i s t o r  as a dominant product. h e  valued a t t r i b u t e s  a r e  lower c os t ,  
TABLE 5 
Transistor Performance 
Frequency (megahertz) 
\ 
1 1 I I I I I .  
Source: Burton H. Klein, Dynamic Economics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), p.130 
fewer f a i l u r e s  and higher  frequency. Note t h a t  t h e  successive t r a n s i s t o r s  
gave a b e t t e r  product i n  a l l  three  dimensions. There was no necess i ty  
f o r  a trade-off between, say ,  cos t s  and r a t e  of f a i l u r e .  It is not  
s u r p r i s i n g  then t h a t  new products supplanted t h e  o ld  ones. 
I n  examining t h e  h i s t o r y  of the  research in tens ive  i n d u s t r i e s .  it 
appears t h a t  they a r e  character ized by a technolgica l  t r a j e c t o r y  t h a t  
generatesdominantproducts. I o f f e r  t h i s  a s  a hypothesis  t h a t  may bear 
f u r t h e r  examination. 
A t h i r d  concept i s  t h a t  of adaptive R&D. Such R&D i s  t h a t  required  
t o  adapt  and incorpora te  innovations t h a t  come from outs ide  t h e  f i rm o r  
country. The concept of appropr iab i l i ty  sketched o u t  previously assumes 
imi ta t ion  is c o s t l e s s .  But even when the  general  concepts a r e  known and 
the  product on the  market, considerable R&D may be required f o r  a f i r m  t o  
produce a comparable product.  Indeed, i n  Levin's survey, respondents 
es t imate  t h a t  an  i m i t a t o r ' s  c o s t  f o r  introducing a product is 50 t o  75 
percent  t h e  c o s t  of the  innovator. Expenditures on imi ta t ive  R6D would 
mean t h a t  i n  indust r ieswhichhave s i g n i f i c a n t  innovations t h e r e  a r e  two 
types of R&D - t h a t  of innovators and t h a t  of i m i t a t o r s  s t ruggl ing t o  
keep up with t h e i r  adapt ive  RCD. Once innovation occurs,  t h e  need f o r  
adapt ive  R&D by i m i t a t o r s  might w e l l  expla in  t h e  h igh research i n t e n s i t y  
of what has  come t o  be c a l l e d  the  high technology i n d u s t r i e s .  
111. INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
I w i l l  confine my remarks t o  i n d u s t r i a l  pol icy  i n  th ree  of the  f i v e  
coun t r i e s  - The United S t a t e s ,  Japan, and the  United Kingdom - because I 
am unfamil iar  wi th  t h e  d e t a i l s  of i n d u s t r i a l  pol icy  i n  France and Germany. 
The Gap Between Socia l  and Pr iva te  Returns. 
Economists have contr ibuted only one idea t o  t h e  d iscuss ion of technology 
pol icy  - t h e  p r i v a t e  marginal r e tu rns  t o  innovation a r e  lower than the  
marginal s o c i a l  r e t u r n s ,  because the  innovator cannot appropr ia te  a l l  the  
marginal r e t u r n s  of the  innovation. The gap between marginal s o c i a l  r e t u r n s  
and p r i v a t e  marginal r e t u r n s  has a c l e a r  policy implicat ion.  Firms w i l l  
spend too l i t t l e  on R&D from t h e  viewpoint of s o c i e t y  s ince  t h e i r  decis ions  
a r e  guided by p r i v a t e  r e t u r n s ,  whereas the  s o c i a l  optimum l e v e l  of R&D 
spending i s  set by s o c i a l  r e tu rns .  
The pioneering work of Edwin Mansfield of t h e  Universi ty of Pennsylvania 
has provided es t ima tes  of t h e  gap between p r i v a t e  and s o c i a l  r a t e s  of 
r e t u r n s  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  innovations. H i s  r e s u l t s ,  along with those of 
Tewksbury, a r e  shown i n  Table 6. Socia l  r e t u r n s  exceed p r i v a t e  r e t u r n s  a s  
one would expect.  The s u r p r i s i n g  fea tu re  of the  empir ica l  work is t h a t  
s o c i a l  r e t u r n s  a r e  on average th ree  times t h e  p r i v a t e  re tu rn .  Around 
t h i s  average t h e r e  i s  a very l a r g e  variance including those  cases  i n  
which s o c i a l  r e t u r n s  a r e  negative.  The wide range r e f l e c t s  the  g rea t  
uncer ta in ty  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  R&S a c t i v i t y .  
That uncer ta in ty  means t h a t  the  gap between s o c i a l  and p r i v a t e  r e t u r n s  
cannot j u s t i f y  a subsidy t o  R&D general ly.  The c a l c u l a t i o n s  i n  Table 6 
a r e  expost;  i n  advance t h e  pol icy  maker does not  know whether t h e  inno- 
v a t i o n  would be l i k e  i n d u s t r i a l  process U ,  i n  which t h e r e  is i n  f a c t  no gap, 
or  l i k e  i n d u s t r i a l  process T, i n  which the re  is a l a r g e  gap. Policy makers 
might r e l y  simply on t h e  average t o  f i n d  R&D underspending and hence t o  
TABLE 6 
SOCIAL AND PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN FROM 
INVESTUENT I N  30 INNOVATIONS 
Rate of r e tu rn  Rate o f  r e tu rn  
Innovations i n  percent  Innovation i n  Percent 
S o c i a l  P r iva t e  Soc ia l  P r iva t e  
Primary metals  17% 10% I n d u s t r i a l  62% 319 
innova t i o n  product A 
Uachine t o o l  8 3 35 I n d u s t r i a l  negat ive  negative 
innovation product B 
Component f o r  29 7 I n d u s t r i a l  116 55 
c o n t r o l  sys  tern Product C 
Construct ion 96 9 I n d u s t r i a l  2 3 0 
ma te r i a l  product D 
D r i l l i n g  5 4 16 I n d u s t r i a l  3 7 9 
m a t e r i a l  product  E 
Draf t i n 9  92 47 I n d u s t r i a l  16 1 4 0 
innovation product F 
Paper 82 42 I n d u s t r i a l  123 24 
innovation product  G 
Thread 30 7 27 I n d u s t r i a l  104 negative 
innovat ion  product H 
Door-control 2 7 37 In- t r i a l  113 12 
innovat ion  product  I 
New e l e c t r o n i c  negat ive  negative I n d u s t r i a l  95 40 
device product J 
Chemical 7 1 9 I n d u s t r i a l  472 127 
product  product  K 
Chemical 3 2 2 5 I n d u s t r i a l  negat ive  13  
process A product  L 
Chemical 1 3  4 I n d u s t r i a l  103 55 
process  B process R 
m j o r  Chemical 56 31 I n d u s t r i a l  29 25 
process  process S 
I n d u s t r i a l  19 8 6 9 
process T 
I n d u s t r i a l  20 20 
- process  U 
m d i a n  rates o f  r e tu rn  
Social P r i v a t e  
fl.Ol11.5( 
Pourcer Column (1) 1 Mansfield ( e t  a1) -Social and P r i v a t e  k t e s  o f  Return 
from I n d u s t r i a l  Innovationsm W E  l u r c h  1977 
Column (2): Twksbury ( e t  a11 mmasur ing  =Societal Benef i t s  
o f  Innovationm Science O/l/80 
Yot.8 k t h  articlas w e d  i d e n t i c a l  e s t h t i o n s  and data c o l l e c t i o n  techniqrwn. 
j u s t i f y  a genera l  po l i cy  of subsidy f o r  a l l  R&D spending. I n  t h e  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  R&D has a modest favorable t ax  t rea tment ,  but  t h e r e  has been 
no g ran t ing  of genera l  subs id ies  t o  R&D. 
C i v i l i a n  Publ ic  R&D Spending 
Ins tead ,  governments have chosen t o  be s e l e c t i v e  i n  t h e  disbursement 
of publ ic  funds t o  subs id ize  R&D. Table 7 shows how such spending has  been 
disbursed among v a r i o u s  po l i cy  ob jec t ives .  Note t h a t  t h e  Table d e a l s  only 
with the  spending f o r  c i v i l i a n  purposes. I n  both t h e  United S t a t e s  and 
t h e  United Kingdom about two-thirds of government R&D spending i s  f o r  
defense and aerospace.  I n  Japan the  corresponding percentage is  s i x t e e n  
percent .  Since I wish t o  focus on t h e  r o l e  of government i n  i n d u s t r i a l  pol icy  
t h e  Table is l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of government R&D spending among 
c i v i l i a n  ob jec t ives .  That d i s t r i b u t i o n  is perhaps a good i n d i c a t o r  of how 
t h e  t h r e e  governments perce ive  t h e i r  r o l e s  a s  promoters of R&D. 
A l l  t h r e e  governments pu t  money i n  t h e  same set of ob jec t ives ,  bu t  t h e  
emphasis v a r i e s .  Agr icu l tu re  R&D has  a long t r a d i t i o n  of government support 
i n  most c o u n t r i e s ,  r e f l e c t i n g  a view t h a t  ind iv idua l  farms a r e  too  small  
t o  c a r r y  o u t  R&D t o  improve t h e i r  product iv i ty .  One s u r p r i s e  is  how much 
t h e  Japanese government spends on a g r i c u l t u r e ,  but  Japan has  10 percent  
of i ts l a b o r  f o r c e  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  about t h r e e  times t h e  percentage i n  
t h e  United S t a t e s  and t h e  United Kingdom. 
Energy research  has increased sharply  i n  a l l  t h r e e  coun t r i e s  s i n c e  t h e  
two o i l  shocks of 1973 and 1979, but i n  a l l  t h r e e  t h e  government was 
a l r eady  involved i n  energy production. Bealth is  a l s o  a t r a d i t i o n a l  
government concern. The proport ion of government spending going t o  h e a l t h  
is not iceably  high i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  perhaps r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  preoccupation 
of t h e  American pub l i c  with t h e i r  h e a l t h .  
TABLE 7 
Government P6D Spending by Socio-Economic Objective 
Percentage Distribution 
United States Japan United Kingdom 
Advancement of knowledge 8.5 19.3 36.5 
Energy and other intrastructure 40.1 29.8 28.7 
Health and Environment 42.9 10.4 11 .O 
Agriculture 7.6 23.1 12.8 
Industry 
Source: Calculated from data in OECD Science and Technology Indicators 
A l l  but two of t h e  i t e m s  l i s t e d  on Table 7 occur i n  s e c t o r s  t h a t  
have a long h i s t o r y  of government involvement a s  both a r egu la to r  and 
provider of s e r v i c e s  a p a r t  from R&D support. The decis ion process i s  
not one which searched t h e  e n t i r e  economy t o  f i n d  where government R&D 
support would be most productive.  Rather, the  R&D spending occurred i n  
s e c t o r s  i n  which t h e  governments were already involved. R&D support was 
simply one more measure t o  promote or  improve p a r t i c u l a r  s e c t o r s  i n  which 
the  government has  long made a general  commitment. 
The exceptions a r e  research spending f o r  the  advancement of knowledge 
and the  promotion of indust ry .  Advancement of knowledge i s  defined a s  
t h e  support of b a s i c  research unconnected with a mission agency. Each 
country has  an agency charged with the  general  support of s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge r a t h e r  than a p a r t i c u l a r  mission, such a s  hea l th .  I n  the  United 
S t a t e s ,  t h e  National Science Foundation, i n  Japan, t h e  Science and Technology 
Agency, and i n  the  United Kingdom, the  Research Councils a r e  such agencies.  
Of course o the r  agencies  support  bas ic  research.  Thus i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  considerable b a s i c  research in biology and biochemistry i s  supported 
by the  h e a l t h  agencies.  But t h e  two types of agencies use  d i f f e r e n t  
c r i t e r i a  t o  a l l o c a t e  t h e i r  funds. The science agencies make t h e i r  decis ions  
by t h e  importance of t h e  research t o  advancement of sc ience ,  t h e  mission 
agencies by whether t h e  research is important f o r  performing a mission 
ob jec t ive  such a s  b e t t e r  h e a l t h  o r  more productive a g r i c u l t u r e .  
The t h r e e  governments recognize t h a t  the  advancement of sc ience  is 
important f o r  technological  progress.  That view is confirmed by t h e  
empir ica l  research c i t e d  e a r l i e r .  Furthermore it is recognized t h a t  
general  s c i e n t i f i c  progress  is not  well  served by a market system. Appro- 
p r i a b i l i t y  has  t h e  most uncer ta in ty  and is t h e  longest  term a s  compared 
t o  appl ied  research and development. The r e s u l t  is t h a t  t h e  Industry 
performs l e s s  than a f i f t h  of a l l  the  bas ic  research i n  these  th ree  
countr ies .  
Instead about s i x t y  percent of a l l  the  bas ic  research is performed 
i n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  i n  a l l  t h r e e  countr ies  with government l abora to r ies  
ranking next .  And i n  t h e  u n iv e r s i t i e s  most of i ts  formal research i s  
supported by the  government. 
Basic research i s  most o f ten  a j o in t  product with education a t  the  
advanced l e v e l s ,  and i n  t h a t  sense un ive r s i t i e s  may be regarded a s  having 
a comparative advantage in bas ic  research.  Univers i t i e s  by t r a d i t i o n  
a r e  not engaged i n  t h e  business of marketing t h e i r  research;  r a t he r  they 
encourage publ ica t ion of research a s  f a s t  and fu r ious ly  a s  they can. 
The phrase publish o r  pe r i sh  well  describes l i f e  i n  what used t o  be 
t r anqu i l  academic c l o i s t e r s .  
Table 7 shows one pecu l ia r  f e a tu r e  about advancement of knowledge: 
the  United Kingdom spends a high proport ion of its publ ic  R&D spending 
i n  t h i s  category compared t o  the  United S t a t e s  and Japan. The r e s u l t  
may be an a r t i f a c t  of the  data .  Basic RbD expenditures shown i n  Table 7 
should exclude general  un ivers i ty  support,  t h a t  is government spending 
primari ly f o r  teaching.  It i s  e a s i e r  t o  make t ha t  d iv i s ion  i n  the  United 
S t a t e s  and Japan - count r i es  with a s i gn i f i c an t  r o l e  f o r  p r iva te  un ive r s i t i e s .  
I n  the  United Kingdom u n iv e r s i t y  support is l a rge ly  from publ ic  funds. 
Government R&D t o  promote indust ry  is the  o ther  exception. This 
ob jec t ive  i s  used t o  descr ibe  government R&D support with an economic 
ob jec t ive  t o  advance technology i n  the  manufacturing i ndus t r i e s  as opposed 
t o  such s ec to r s  a s  a g r i c u l t u r e .  Table 7 shows the  United S t a t e s  is a t  
one extreme of l i t t l e  publ ic  funding f o r  such R&D and Japan a t  the  o ther .  
The U.S. government takes  the  pos i t ion  t ha t  indust ry  U D  should be ca r r i ed  
out  and financed by the  p r i v a t e  sec to r .  Indeed, its reply  t o  an OECD study 
states, "It is against the fundamental principles of United States policy 
to give direct aid to industrial technicological development." The small 
positive entry in Table 7 reflects a few old programs tucked away in odd 
corners of the Federal government. 
Japan represents the opposite tradition. The Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) supports R&D with commercial objectives in both 
its own laboratories and in industry. Table 7, which shows a large role 
for the Japanese government and a small roleforthe United States, seems 
at first glance inconsistent with Table 2, where the U.S. government has 
a large share in the financing of industrial R&D and Japan has a small share. 
The difference is explained by the fact that Table 2 reflects defense 
spending; Table 7 does not. One other matter; Table 7 is stated in per- 
centage terms,and the U.S. government spending, apart from defense, is 
eight billion dollars; the Japanese government spending is about five 
billion dollars. The difference then is not that large in absolute terms. 
More specifically, the Japanese government spends about 450 million dollars 
on the promotion of general industry R&D; the U.S. spends about 92 million 
dollars. 
Still it is important to recall that the Japanese government expendi- 
tures are only about four percent of all Japanese industrial RCD. The 
small percentage still may give the Japanese government considerable influence 
over the general direction of R&D. This influence may be reflected in the 
publication which MITI plans, Visions of future R&D priorities. The current 
Vision for the Eighties, foresees Japan as a "technology based nation." 
MITI R&D support is now and will be even more so focussed on three broad 
fields:(l) materials, (2) biotechnology, and (3) information processing, 
including computers and integrated circuits. 
Japan represen t s  t h e  opposi te  t r a d i t i o n .  The Ministry of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Trade and Indust ry  (MITI) does support R6D with commercial ob jec t ives  i n  
both i t s  own l a b o r a t o r i e s  and i n  indust ry .  MITI has published t h e  Vision 
of t h e  Eighties ,which fo resees  Japan a s  a  "technology based nat ion."  
MITI R&D support  is  now and w i l l  be even more so  focussed on t h r e e  broad 
f i e l d s :  (1) m a t e r i a l s ,  (2) biotechnology , and (3) i n £  ormation processing,  
inc luding computers and in teg ra ted  c i r c u i t s .  
Information processing is t h e  one f i e l d  i n  which MITI has  been a c t i v e  
f o r  some time. Its b e s t  known program is  t he  Very Large Scale In tegra ted  
C i r c u i t  program (VLSI), which ex i s t ed  from 1975 t o  1979. Its p r i n c i p l e  
f e a t u r e s  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  d i s t i n c t i v e  Japanese approach t o  government support 
of R&D. These a r e  (1) t h e  organiza t ion  of a  research assoc ia t ion  composed 
of f i v e  l a r g e  Japanese manufacturers of in tegra ted  c i r c u i t s .  The research  
a s s o c i a t i o n  ho lds  p a t e n t s  der ived from t h e  p r o j e c t ,  d i s t r i b u t e s  t h e  research  
r e s u l t s ,  and p lays  a key r o l e  i n  t h e  governance of t h e  p ro jec t .  By i t s  
a b i l i t y  t o  g r a n t  andwithhold subs id ies ,  MITI has a  ve to  over a s s o c i a t i o n  
decis ions .  (2) The resea rch  i t s e l f  is gener ic ,  t h a t  is, t o  so lve  common 
problems i n  designing and producing very l a r g e  s c a l e  in teg ra ted  c i r c u i t s .  
The development of s p e c i f i c  products  i s  l e f t  t o  t h e  research  organiza t ions  
of t h e  companies and i s  company f inanced.  (3) The funding f o r  the  research  
done under t h e  p r o j e c t  i t s e l f  comes p a r t l y  from t h e  government and p a r t l y  
from t h e  companies. (4) The p r o j e c t  research  is done l a rge ly  i n  two group 
l a b o r a t o r i e s  and by r e s e a r c h e r s  assigned by t h e  companies from t h e i r  s t a f f s .  
A t  t h e  end of t h e  f o u r  yea r  p r o j e c t  researchers  r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  companies, 
and i n  t h i s  way f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of technology. 
Such an  R&D organ iza t ion  is a blending of p r i v a t e  and publ ic  R&D i n  
i ts f inancing and a blending of ind iv idua l  company and j o i n t  RLD. The 
VLSI program is considered t o  have a good record of research  achievement. 
I ts  success  has  a t t r a c t e d  cons iderable  a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
and has  r a i s e d  q u e s t i o n s  a s  t o  whether such o rgan iza t ions  would be 
va luab le  i n  t h e  U.S. con tex t .  While a novel  o rgan iza t ion ,  t h e  VLSI program 
took  p l a c e  i n  t h e  con tex t  of a semiconductor i n d u s t r y  t h a t  was simul- 
taneous ly  c a r r y i n g  on a h igh  volume of p r i v a t e l y  f inanced R&D. Even 
a t  t h e  he igh t  of t h e  VLSI program about 85 percent  of t h e  R&D was 
p r i v a t e l y  f inanced  o u t s i d e  of t h e  VLSI program. The Japanese product ion  
and expor t  of i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s  has  increased  notab ly  s i n c e  1976. 
It i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  however, t o  d i s t r i b u t e  t h e  ga in  between c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of 
t h e  VLSI and s i m i l a r  programs and t h e  p r i v a t e l y  f inanced  RbD. 
Does I n d u s t r i a l  P o l i c y  Mat te r?  
There is  deba te  a s  t o  whether t h e  e x p l i c i t  measures of i n d u s t r i a l  
p o l i c y  d i r e c t e d  a t  RbD m a t t e r  a l l  t h a t  much f o r  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  advance of 
a n  economy. One f a c t o r  t h a t  may count f o r  more i s  educa t iona l  p o l i c y .  
Japan has  r e c e n t l y  been h i g h l y  succes s fu l  wi th  i t s  high  technology i n d u s t r i e s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s  and computers. A t  t h e  same t ime Japan 
has  i nc reased  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i t s  supply of e l e c t r i c a l  engineers .  I n  t h e  
mid s i x t i e s  bo th  t h e  United S t a t e s  and Japan had 80 e l e c t r i c a l  eng inee r s  
pe r  m i l l i o n  of popu la t ion .  By 1977, Japan had 185 e l e c t r i c a l  eng inee r s  
p e r  m i l l i o n  of popu la t ion  and t h e  United S t a t e s  had 66. From 1969 t o  1977 
t h e  number of Japanese  e l e c t r i c a l  engineerswho graduated annual ly  doubled; 
t h e  a b s o l u t e  number i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  s tayed  cons t an t .  I f  one t a k e s  
t h e  view t h a t  eng inee r s  a r e  t h e  f o o t s o l d i e r s  of t echno log ica l  advance, 
t h e  educa t iona l  p o l i c y  t h a t  genera ted  more engineers  i s  a d i s t i n c t  a s s e t  
t o  t e c h n i c a l  p rog res s ,  perhaps of more importance than  t h e  measures 
MITI h a s  adopted. 
Let  me r e t u r n  t o  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  I made a t  t h e  o u t s e t  - t h a t  most 
RbD i n  t h e  f i v e  c o u n t r i e s  is  by p r i v a t e  companies w i t h  t h e i r  own funds.  
A s  a r e s u l t ,  t he  t echn ica l  change these  companies generate is  influenced 
pr imar i ly  by market cond i t ions  r a t h e r  than government policy d i rec ted  
a t  e i t h e r  t e c h n i c a l  change o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  indus t r i e s .  Again we must make 
a n  exception f o r  s e c t o r s  i n  which government involvement i s  extensive:  
aerospace,  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  h e a l t h ,  and energy. 
For t h e  remaining s e c t o r s ,  t h e  importance of markets does not  mean 
t h a t  government po l i cy  is unimportant,  but t h a t  government policy works 
through i t s  impact on markets.  The pol icy  measures t h a t  matter, however, 
may no t  be those  of i n d u s t r i a l  po l i cy ,  but those of general  economic pol icy .  
Under t h i s  heading belongs f i s c a l  and monetary po l i cy ,  t r a d e  pol icy ,  
t ax  po l i cy ,  and a n t i t r u s t  po l i cy ,  and even labor  r e l a t i o n s .  These p o l i c i e s  
a r e  set l a r g e l y  by o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  a r e  f a r  from t h e  promotion of R&D o r  the  
high technology i n d u s t r i e s .  Y e t  they have a major impact on those i n d u s t r i e s .  
High technology i n d u s t r i e s  seem t o  t h r i v e  only i n  a t h r i v i n g  economy. 
Japan 's  success  i n  t h e  high technology i n d u s t r i e s  may owe more t o  the  
f a c t  t h a t  i ts  economy has  done much b e t t e r  than o the r  OECD economies 
than i t  does t o  s p e c i f i c  MITI p o l i c i e s .  And the  United Kingdom's r e l a t i v e  
f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  same i n d u s t r i e s  may be l a i d  more a t  t h e  door of its 
macropolicy makers than a t  t h e  door of i t s  Ministry of Technology. 
This  is a specu la t ive  conclusion.  I began my t a l k  with t h e  s t e w  
and pepper analogy. What we s t i l l  do not  know is whether i n d u s t r i a l  
pol icy  rep resen t s  j u s t  a pinch of pepper i n  a bland s t e w  o r  t h e  teaspoon of 
pepper i n  a pepper pot  s t e w  i n  which pepper is t h e  dominant ingredient .  
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